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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant: JAMES D. CONDER 
(Hereinafter, "Conder") 
Defendants and 
Respondents: A,L. WILLIAMS & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Georgia corporation, 
(hereinafter, "A.L. Williams") 
MASSACHUSETTS INDEMNITY AND 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Massachusetts corporation, 
(hereinafter, "MILICO") 
Defendant: BRYCE D. PETERSON 
(Mr. Peterson did not join 
in the motion in the lower 
court and is not a party 
to this Appeal.) 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the admissible evidence before the 
court below was sufficient to establish genuine issues 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment 
as a matter of law. 
2. Whether Conder was permitted under Utah 
law to affirm an employment contract upon learning of 
the fraud and misrepresentation which induced him to enter 
into said contract, and pursue his remedy in damages. 
3. Whether Conder was required to rescind said 
contract in order to mitigate his damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Conder stands on his Statement of the Case set 
forth in his primary brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Conder stands on his Statement of Facts as set 
forth in his primary brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Conder f s reliance on the fraudulent misrep-
resentations of A.L. Williams and MILICO was reasonable 
at the time he was induced to act thereon. The requirements 
of a prima facie case in fraud are that a person reason-
ably rely on a misrepresentation and then be induced to 
act to his injury. Such a case does not depend upon the 
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reasonableness, or lack thereof, of his acts after learning 
of the falsity of the statements which induced him to 
act. 
2. The doctrine of avoidable consequences is 
misapplied at this stage of the proceedings. The issue 
of damages has not been considered by the court and is 
a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts. 
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is inappropriate 
to determine whether, as a matter of law, partial summary 
judgment should be granted. 
3* Matters not before the trial court should 
not be considered on appeal. Deposition testimony, not 
published in the court below, was not considered by it, 
and should not be considered on appeal. This issue was 
disposed of by order of this Court, dated February 19, 
1985. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONDER'S RELIANCE ON THE FRAUDULENT 
MISREPRESENTATIONS OF A.L. WILLIAMS 
AND MILICO WAS REASONABLE AT THE TIME 
HE WAS INDUCED TO ACT THEREON 
A.L. Williams and MILICO argue that Conder's 
reliance on their fraudulent misrepresentations became 
unreasonable after he learned of the falsity of the misrep-
resentations. (Brief, pp. 6,9) By doing so, they concede 
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that the statements were made and that they were fraudulent 
and false. More important to the issues on appeal, that 
argument confuses the requirements for a prima facie case 
in fraud and misrepresentation with the remedies available 
to the victims thereof. 
Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124 
(Utah 1982), citing Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 
P.2d 273 (1952), sets forth the elements of a prima facie 
case for fraud which have prevailed for years. In that 
case, this Court said, 
To maintain a cause of action for fraud 
the person must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence the existence of each of the following 
elements: 
. . . (6)that the . . .[victim], acting reasonably 
and in ignorance of its falsity; (7)did 
in fact rely upon it; (8)and was thereby 
induced to act; (9)to his injury and damage. 
The victim must reasonably rely on a misrepresen-
tation and be induced thereby to act to his damage. That 
had already occurred when Conder finally learned of the 
fraud. (R512 1110) It is a misapplication of the elements 
set forth in Mikkelson and Pace to argue that the question 
of reasonableness can apply after the act occurs which 
was induced by Conder1s reliance on the fraudulent misrep-
resentations of A.L. Williams and MILICO. 
A.L. Williams and MILICO also argue, (Brief, 
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pp. 7-9) that Conder should have known at the time of 
signing his Agent Agreement with MILICO that he would 
only be selling insurance, contrary to what he had been 
told. This selective view of the facts is not supported 
by the evidence and gives a distorted view of the picture 
presented to potential recruits of A.L. Williams and MILICO. 
Insurance was only one Tfside of the house" that 
was touted by A.L. Williams and iMILICO and their represent-
atives. They also claimed to have a "real estate" and 
an "investment side of the house." (R511 ^3) By signing 
the Agent Agreement, Conder believed he was fulfilling 
the requirements to get started in the "insurance side" 
of the house. He subsequently asked about his training 
in real estate and investments but he was "put off, being 
told that they would get into it later." (R512 ^9) Signing 
a-n Agent Agreement to allow him to get started in insurance 
did not put Conder on notice that he would not be getting 
into the real estate and investment business as well, 
especially in light of the continuing assurances that 
they would get into it later. 
The cases cited by A.L. Williams and MILICO 
in support of their position, (Brief, pp. 7-8) all hold 
that where a person has information in his possession 
to refute the false representations he has received, he 
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cannot reasonably say he relied upon the misrepresentations. 
In this case, Conder does not deny that he knew that he 
was going to be involved with insurance. However, the 
insurance Agent Agreement did not reveal that he would 
not be engaged in the other areas of asset management 
and investment counseling as he had been assured he would 
be . 
The facts before the court below show that, 
when Conder left his former employment and went to work 
for A.L. Williams and MILICO, he had no reason to believe 
that they were misrepresenting to him the nature of their 
authority to conduct business, and his reliance upon said 
misrepresentations was reasonable under the circumstances. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES 
IS MISAPPLIED AT THIS STAGE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS 
A.L. Williams and MILICO next invoke the avoid-
able consequences doctrine to claim that Conder did not 
mitigate his damages after learning of the fraud by seeking 
employment elsewhere. Conder contends that even if that 
doctrine w^re applicable, it would not justify the granting 
below of the Motion for Summary Judgment. Whether he 
had properly mitigated his damages would have to be a 
question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. 
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A.L. Williams and MILICO assume that the only way to miti-
gate damages in this case would be for Conder to quit 
his employment* Such a solution would have been highly 
questionable during the period of economic recession and 
relatively high unemployment that prevailed at the time. 
More important, the doctrine relates to the amount of 
damages that may be awarded if a prima facie case is proved. 
It cannot be invoked to destroy a prima facie case. 
Conder believes that his actions, after learning 
of the fraud, fall within the rule of Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980), relating to the remedies 
available to the victims of fraud: 
The plaintiff in an action for fraud has 
the option to elect to rescind the transaction 
and recover the purchase price or to affirm 
the transaction and recover damages. The choice 
of remedy belongs to the victim of the fraud, 
and a choice cannot be forced upon him. 
By not leaving A.L. Williams and MILICO upon 
learning of the fraud, Conder was exercising his option 
to affirm the contract as permitted by Dugan, supra. 
A.L. Williams and MILICO would have limited Conder to 
rescinding the contract by requiring him to leave the 
position he held with them. However, the choice belongs 
to the victim of the fraud, as noted in Dugan, not the 
perpetrator thereof. 
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POINT III 
MATTERS NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 
Points III, IV and V of the Brief of Respondent, 
pp. 11-16, attempt to revive the issue disposed of by 
this Court upon the Motion of A.Lo Williams and MILICO 
to Supplement the Record at the hearing thereon held by 
this Court on February 19, 1985. Said Motion was denied 
by Order dated the same day. 
A.L. Williams and MILICO again claim that Conder 
is raising an objection to the deposition testimony for 
the first time on appeal, and assert that Conder argues 
that Judge Daniels erred by relying upon deposition testi-
mony in granting partial summary judgment. That is incor-
rect. No such argument has been made. Judge Daniels 
did not rely upon the deposition testimony of Conder for 
his decision because it was not properly before him. 
Conder simply mentioned the issue in his Intro-
duction to his Statement of Law while setting forth the 
standards which are followed in considering an appeal 
of a summary judgment. His argument on the substantive 
issues then followed. 
Conder did not object to the statements made 
in the Memorandum filed by A.L. Williams and MILICO because 
the Memorandum, being the statement of counsel, was not 
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evidence. No objections were interposed by Conder to 
the admission of evidence at that hearing because no evi-
dence was offered by A.L. Williams and MILICO. 
The argument is made that Conder waived his 
right to object to the use of the deposition testimony 
by citing from the deposition himself. This argument 
fails and would have failed had it been raised by Conder 
in an attempt to have the Court consider the matters he 
quoted. In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co. , 14 Utah 2d 334, 
384 P.2d 109 (1963), both parties cited from the depositions 
in their briefs, although the deposition remained sealed 
and had never been seen by the lower court or this Court. 
In a footnote to its decision, this Court noted that the 
correctness of the deposition copies used by the parties 
was not known. That point is well taken. Since the deposi-
tion of Mr. Conder remained in the sealed envelope in 
the clerk's office during the entire proceeding below, 
there is no way to check the accuracy of the citations 
or the context in which they are found. 
Conder did not attempt to establish his entire 
case in the proceeding below on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. It was only incumbent upon him to establish 
that there were genuine issues of material fact and that 
A.L. Williams and MILICO were not entitled to judgment 
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as a matter of law. He cited the depositions in his argu-
ment because A.L. Williams and MILICO had done so, but 
he also introduced evidence in the form of affidavits 
and sworn answers to interrogatories in support of his 
position. The statements in the depositions, cited by 
both parties, would also have established clearly that 
there were genuine issues of material fact had they been 
introduced, but since they were not, that determination 
must be made by whatever was, in fact, properly before 
the court. 
The decision of this Court in denying the Motion 
of A.L. Williams and MILICO to Supplement the Record with 
Conderfs depositions, entered on February 19, 1985, was 
correct. 
CONCLUSION 
Conder respectfully requests, based upon the 
foregoing and his primary brief, that this Court set aside 
the Partial Summary Judgment entered by the court below 
and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this 27th day of March, 1985. 
^SPEOTFULLY SUBMITTED?, 
Dennis L. Wright 
Attorney for Appfell 
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